As each domino fell, starting in the summer of 2007, it became increasingly clear that the economy was in serious trouble. But the surprising truth was that almost everyone, from economists, investors, politicians to consumers, played along to the end. They played along until the evidence was so overwhelming that they were forced to capitulate and acknowledge the mistakes of the past and the consequences these mistakes had for the global economy.

As a step? Why didn’t our leaders in the financial and political communities see it coming? And why did these leaders rush to fire the few who saw it coming?

One explanation is that the financial tsunami started slowly. Some have suggested that he started with the easy money from 2001 to mid-2008 that kept mortgage interest rates low (30-year fixed-rate mortgages went from more than 8 percent in 2000 to a low of 5 ¾ percent in 2004 and then increased to 6 percent in 2008). Then the tsunami began to gather momentum as prospective buyers scrambled to buy houses at attractive interest rates, many with a minimal down payment. Fueling the frenzy were high-commission-motivated mortgage brokers who arranged low-down payment loans and often looked the other way when it was clear that the buyer could barely meet monthly payments. But few critical voices were raised, no one listened, and the financial tsunami continued.

Secured Debt Obligations (CDOs) were created to help financial institutions that were eager to participate in the good times by earning high returns. These CDOs simply bundled mortgages, some of which were marginal, and sold them to banks and insurance companies as high-yield investments. Then, credit default swaps (CDS) were created to insure the CDOs. As a result, any investment bank that bought a CDO in conjunction with a CDS to secure the CDO would be confident that their investment was insured. Nobody to spoil a good party, top-notch rating agencies, including Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s, gave CDOs top ratings? Once again, few critical voices were raised, no one listened, and the financial tsunami continued.

When house prices stopped rising, the housing bubble collapsed. Prices fell and an increasing number of homeowners owed more than the market value of their homes. More homes were then placed on the market, leading to lower prices and the spiral continued. Defaults began to increase. But because there were many disconnects in this complex web, financial institutions continued to hold CDOs on their balance sheets at prices that no longer reflected the fact that many of the mortgages included in CDOs were at risk. With a weakened balance sheet, financial institutions, such as Lehman Brothers, went bankrupt or closed their lending operations for fear that they would never be repaid. Now, however, some critical voices emerged, some people listened, but assured us that the damage could be contained.

Then came the recession. Credit ran out, companies laid off workers, and consumers tightened their belts. The damage was so great, with no end in sight, that the silence ended abruptly. Now the finger pointing began. Everybody was listening.

But it was too late.

What was unprecedented was that the conspiracy of silence lasted so long. Yes, some economists and politicians warned that we were on a collision course and that the economy could not sustain the pace and the level of debt for long. In 2005, Robert J. Shiller, an economics professor at Yale, warned of a housing bubble. Then, in September 2007, he told Congress that the recession in the housing market could turn into the most severe recession since the depression. Shortly thereafter, in November 2007, at an international conference in Dubai, he warned that a global collapse was imminent. Indeed, Shiller, as well as others, including Paul Krugman, winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in economics, spoke out, but few listened.

And the silence was not limited to Wall Street. The management of the big three auto companies remained silent. Even if some questioned a corporate strategy focused on designing cars that would stand up to the world’s growing fuel and environmental crises, most remained silent. And investors and regulators alike were suspicious of Bernard L. Madoff’s alleged Ponzi scheme but said nothing. In 2001, Erin Arvedlund, a Barrons reporter, wrote an article that raised questions about Modoff’s strategy that produced consistent returns much better than the returns on other funds. However, nothing came out of the article. They all apparently “went ahead to get along” and in the process reaped the short-term economic benefits or, in the case of the Big Three, secured their personal short-term futures.

One way to make sense of this process is to borrow the term Think in a group of the management literature.

Think in a group it is often used to describe situations in which people “get along”. It occurs when social pressures within a group prevent people from expressing their concerns. It occurs when conflict is minimized and, as a result, group processes and decisions face few difficult tests.

Think in a group during this financial crisis it was widespread. Nobody wanted to ask questions about what was happening. The few who did were ignored. In fact, this may have been the most vivid example of think in group since Irving Janus wrote extensively on the subject in 1977.

Unfortunately, Think in a group it may be inescapable. It can be a systematic bias that we all share in a wide range of human social behaviors whenever we collaborate with others to achieve common goals. It is prevalent in modern organizations, both business and government. Only the most open, externally focused, and agile organizations can guard against it. Established bureaucracies, such as General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, are at the greatest risk.

If there is a lesson for organizations, one that has been underscored by this financial crisis, it is this: Group Think sacrifices critical analysis and conflict for immediate comfort.